Filed February 8, 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 99-5697
TRANSPORTES FERREOS DE VENEZUELA
II CA,
Appellant
v.
NKK CORPORATION; EDC, INC.;
THE SHEFFER CORPORATION
THE SHEFFER CORPORATION,
Third-Party Plaintiff
v.
JORGENSEN STEEL & ALUMINUM,
a division of
EARLE M. JORGENSEN COMPANY; ARTCO,
INC.,
Third-Party Defendants
EDC, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff
v.
HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Third-Party Defendant
Appeal from the United States District
Court
for the District of New Jersey
D.C. No. 96-cv-04016
District Judge: Dickinson R. Debevoise
Argued: December 4, 2000
Before: McKEE, ROSENN, and CUDAHY,*
Circuit Judges.
(Filed: February 8, 2001)
Robert G. Clyne (argued)
Hill Rivkins & Hayden LLP
1 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Jersey City, NJ 07302-3911
Counsel for Appellant
Michael J. Breslin, Jr., Esq. (ar
gued)
Breslin & McNerney
14 Washington Place
Hackensack, New Jersey 07601
Counsel for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.
In April 1995, the ship boom on
a vessel owned by
Transportes Ferreos de Venezuela II
CA (TFV) collapsed.
TFV sued EDC, Inc., the boom's designer
and supplier , and
in August 1998, the parties settled.
As part of the
settlement, EDC agreed to the entry
of a $1 million
judgment against it, in favor of TFV.
TFV agr eed not to
execute this judgment, and in exchange,
EDC assigned its
rights under an insurance contract
it held with Hartford
Fire Insurance Company (Hartford) to
TFV . TFV then
attempted to recover the amount of
EDC's $1 million
settlement from Hartford. The district
court found for
Hartford, holding that Hartford was
substantially
prejudiced by the fact that it was
not notified of the
accident until three years after it
happened. W e reverse and
remand.
_________________________________________________________________
* Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, Circuit
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
2
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
TFV owned two vessels that it used
to transport ir on ore:
the M/V Rio Caroni (a bulk carrier)
and the F/T Boca
Grande (a floating terminal and transfer
station). The Rio
Caroni carried iron ore down the Orinoco
River in
Venezuela from various inland points
and, on arrival at the
mouth of the river, unloaded the ore
onto the Boca Grande.
The Boca Grande then placed the ore
on ocean-going
vessels.
In August 1992, TFV's predecessor,
Deltamar S.A.,
entered into a contract with the NKK
Corporation for the
conversion of the Rio Caroni from bulk
carrier to self-
unloading shuttle vessel. As part of
the conversion, NKK
was required to build a materials handling
system--
consisting essentially of a series
of conveyor belts and a
boom--that would be placed on the Rio
Caroni to facilitate
the movement of iron ore onto the vessel
and its discharge
from the vessel. NKK subcontracted
the design and
furnishing of the materials handling
system to EDC, Inc.,
which was to provide NKK with engineering
expertise,
drawings and parts. In turn, NKK would
then assemble the
provided parts to complete the conversion
of the Rio Caroni.
See Appx. 119.
One of the parts EDC contracted
to supply was a boom
cylinder, which formed part of the
boom's hoisting
mechanism. Because EDC was itself unable
to build the
boom cylinder, EDC subcontracted the
manufacture of this
part to the Sheffer Corporation. Exactly
which party
designed the boom cylinder is unclear
from the record on
appeal. The purchase order for the
boom cylinder, which
refers to a "Sheffer Hydraulic
Boom Hoist Cylinder,"
indicates that Sheffer regularly of
fered several standard
boom cylinder models for sale to the
public. See Appx. 142.
However, the numerous specifications
in the purchase
order--for example, the purchase or
der stated that "blind
or piston end of the cylinder to have
pivot mount . . .
suitable for 350 mm pin"--indicate
that EDC pr ovided at
least some special parameters with
which Shef fer's cylinder
was required to comply. See id. As
such, the boom cylinder
3
appears to be a modified Sheffer
cylinder , custom-built to
EDC's specifications.
On April 15, 1995, the Rio Caroni's
new boom suddenly
collapsed while the vessel was unloading
ore onto the Boca
Grande, damaging both vessels. An investigation
by W alter
Herbst, president of EDC, revealed
that the boom's collapse
was due to a sudden fracture of the
steel r od-eye, a
component of the boom cylinder that
had been built for
EDC by Sheffer. See Appx. 151. However,
Herbst's report
was not able to pinpoint the exact
cause of the r od-eye's
failure, giving ten possible reasons
for it--including possible
design and manufacturing defects. At
the request of TFV,
EDC arranged for metallurgical testing
of the rod-eye by
Professional Services Industries, Inc.
(PSI) to determine the
precise cause of the rod-eye's failur
e. PSI determined that
the rod-eye failed in a brittle manner,
possibly due to its
fabrication from an inferior grade
of steel. See Appx. 161-
62. Following PSI's analysis of the
rod-eye, EDC refused to
pay a monthly storage fee for the rod-eye.
Consequently,
the rod-eye was discarded by PSI prior
to the
commencement of this suit, and it cannot
now be
recovered.
B. District Court Proceedings
On August 21, 1996, TFV filed suit
in the United States
District Court for the District of
New Jersey against NKK,
EDC and Sheffer, seeking an awar d
of $3.6 million for the
physical damage to its vessels, as
well as compensation for
economic losses attributed to the vessels'
being out of
operation. In its answer to TFV's complaint,
EDC asserted
a cross-claim against Sheffer, alleging
that Sheffer should
pay any judgment entered against EDC
because it had
improperly manufactured the rod-eye.
The district court
had subject matter jurisdiction over
this cause pursuant to
28 U.S.C. S 1332.
Through discovery, TFV learned that
EDC was insured
under a policy with Hartford. This
Compr ehensive General
Liability and Business Liability Policy
provided a $2 million
aggregate limit for business liability
claims. On March 6,
1998, TFV notified Hartford of the
accident and pending
litigation. (Thus, Hartford became
awar e of the accident
4
approximately three years after
the accident occurred and
not until after this litigation was
instituted.) On May 15,
1998, EDC brought suit in New Jersey
state court, seeking
from Hartford coverage and/or a defense
of TFV's suit.
Hartford denied both coverage and a
defense; thereafter, for
reasons not reflected in the recor
d on appeal, the state
court action was dismissed. Hartford
was then brought into
the instant action as a third-party
defendant by way of
EDC's third-party complaint. In its
thir d-party answer to
this complaint, dated July 8, 1998,
Hartford denied that its
policy covered EDC for the losses sustained
on TFV's
vessels and refused to defend EDC in
the pr esent action.
See Appx. 46-53.
On August 10, 1998, approximately
one month after
being joined in the present lawsuit,
Hartfor d, along with the
other parties to this suit, attended
an all-day settlement
conference before the magistrate judge
assigned to this
case. At the conference, TFV agreed
to settle its claims
against all parties for $1.85 million.
During the settlement
conference, the magistrate judge informed
Hartford that it
could settle on behalf of EDC for $750,000.
If Hartford
chose not to settle, the magistrate
advised the participants
that EDC was going to consent to judgment
in the amount
of $1 million and assign its rights
under the insurance
contract to TFV. At Hartford's r equest,
the magistrate judge
allowed it two weeks to consider which
of the two options
it would accept.
Hartford chose not to settle on
behalf of EDC. Instead, in
a letter dated August 18, 1998, Hartford
infor med EDC that
it would now agree to provide EDC with
a defense, subject
to a reservation of rights as to coverage
of the claim. See
Appx. 377. On August 26, counsel for
all parties
participated in a telephone conference
with the magistrate
judge, during which the judge informed
Hartfor d that, in
spite of Hartford's offer to defend
EDC, the parties had
signed a settlement agreement. Under
the final terms of the
settlement, TFV received $500,000 from
Sheffer and
$350,000 from various parties, including
NKK and the
supplier of the steel used in the rod-eye's
manufacture. The
settlement also made EDC liable to
TFV for $1 million.
However, because EDC could not affor
d to pay the $1
5
million settlement amount, it consented
instead to a
judgment against it in favor of TFV.
TFV agr eed not to
execute this judgment, and in exchange
EDC assigned all of
its claims against Hartford to TFV.
Thus, following the settlement,
TFV and Hartfor d were
the only two parties remaining in this
suit. TFV moved, and
Hartford cross-moved, for summary judgment.
The district
court granted Hartford's motion for
summary judgment,
finding that the late notice of the
accident voided coverage.
The district court also found that
Hartford suf fered
substantial prejudice due to the late
notice because EDC's
consent to disposal of the rod-eye
prevented Hartford from
examining the rod-eye itself. The district
court believed that
Hartford was further prejudiced because
the late notice
prevented it from filing a cross-claim
for indemnification
against Sheffer.
TFV appeals. We have appellate jurisdiction
over both the
grant of Hartford's summary judgment
motion and the
denial of TFV's motion. See 28 U.S.C.
S 1291.
II. DISCUSSION
The decision below arises out of
cross-motions for
summary judgment. Such motions:
are no more than a claim by each
side that it alone is
entitled to summary judgment, and the
making of such
inherently contradictory claims does
not constitute an
agreement that if one is rejected the
other is
necessarily justified or that the losing
party waives
judicial consideration and determination
whether
genuine issues of material fact exist.
Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402
F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir.
1968). In addition, "when an appeal
from a denial of
summary judgment is raised in tandem
with an appeal of
an order granting a cross-motion for
summary judgment,
we have jurisdiction to review the
propriety of the denial of
summary judgment by the district court."
Nazay v. Miller,
949 F.2d 1323, 1328 (3d Cir. 1991).
Our review of the
district court's decision on the motions
for summary
judgment is plenary. See International
Union, United Mine
6
Workers of America v. Racho Trucking
Co., 897 F.2d 1248,
1252 (3d Cir. 1990). We will uphold
a grant (or reverse a
denial) of summary judgment only when
there is no
genuine issue of material fact and
a party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Because there is no dispute that
New Jersey law governs
in this case, we do not question its
application. See
Newport Assocs. Development Co. v.
The Travelers
Indemnity Co. of Ill., 162 F.3d 789,
791 (3d Cir. 1998).
Under New Jersey law, the words of
an insurance contract
are given their ordinary meaning, unless
they are
ambiguous. See 495 Corp. v. N.J. Ins.
Underwriting Ass'n.,
430 A.2d 203, 206 (N.J. 1981). We test
for ambiguity by
asking whether the policy's phrasing
is "so confusing that
the average policyholder cannot make
out the boundaries of
coverage." Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick,
Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 795
(N.J. 1979).
TFV presents two issues on appeal:
(1) whether Hartford
was appreciably prejudiced because
it r eceived late
notification of the accident and because
the r od-eye was
lost or destroyed and (2) whether the
insurance contract
between EDC and Hartford covered EDC's
liability to TFV.
We address these issues in turn.
A. Late Notice
The insurance contract between EDC
and Hartfor d
required that EDC notify Hartford pr
omptly of any accident
that might result in a claim:
E. LIABILITY AND MEDICAL EXPENSES
GENERAL
CONDITIONS
2. Duties in the Event of Occurrence,
Claim or Suit.
a. You must see to it that we are
notified promptly
of an "occurrence" or an
offense which may
result in a claim.
***
b. If a claim is made or "suit"
is br ought against
any insured, you must:
(1) Immediately record the specifics
of the claim
7
or "suit" and the date
received; and
(2) Notify us as soon as practicable.
You must see to it that we receive
a written notice of
the claim or "suit" as soon
as practicable.
Appx. 256. The insurance contract
defines an "occurrence"
as "an accident" and a "suit"
as "a civil proceeding in which
damages because of . . . `property
damage' .. . to which
this insurance applies are alleged."
See Appx. 260. Thus,
the rod-eye failure qualifies as an"occurrence,"
and this
cause qualifies as a "suit,"
as those ter ms are defined in the
contract. Consequently, EDC was, upon
learning of the
accident, obligated to notify Hartford.
Hartford argues--and the district
court agreed--that
Hartford cannot be liable to EDC because
EDC did not
provide Hartford with prompt notice
of the accident, as
required under the insurance contract.
However, for an
insurer to assert the defense of late
notice under New
Jersey law, the insurer must prove
not only that it was
given late notice of the accident (here,
TFV does not dispute
that its notice was late), but also
that it suf fered
appreciable prejudice as a result of
the late notice. See
Chemical Leaman Tank Lines v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety
Co., 89 F.3d 976, 996 (3d Cir. 1996)
(noting that New
Jersey law requires showing of appr
eciable prejudice);
Solvents Recovery Service of New England
v. Midland Ins.
Co., 526 A.2d 1112, 1114 (N.J. App.
Div. 1987) (noting that
insurer bears burden of proving appr
eciable prejudice). New
Jersey courts look to two factors in
analyzing whether a
party has suffered appreciable pr ejudice:
(1) whether
substantial rights have been irretrievably
lost by virtue of
the insured's failure to give timely
notice; and (2) whether
the likelihood of success of the insurer
in defending against
the underlying claim has been adversely
affected. See
Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 89 F.3d
at 996-97.
Under New Jersey Law, mere conjecture
or suspicions
may not form the basis for establishing
appr eciable
prejudice. See Molyneaux v. Molyneaux,
553 A.2d 49, 54
(N.J. App. Div. 1989). Indeed, "the
insur er [must] establish
more than the mere fact that it cannot
employ its normal
procedures in investigating and evaluating
the claim,
8
[r]ather it must show that substantial
rights have been
irretrievably lost." Kitchnefsky
v. National Rent-A-Fence of
America, Inc., 88 F.Supp.2d 360, 368
(D.N.J. 2000)
(internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). These
rights "include . . . `the preparation
and preservation of
demonstrative and illustrative evidence
such as vehicles or
photographs, and the ability of experts
to r econstruct the
scene.' " J.T. Baker v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 1996
WL 451316 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting Morales
v. National
Grange Mutual Ins. Co., 176 N.J. Super.
347, 355 (Law Div.
1980)).
Hartford believes that the above
standar ds are satisfied
by two actions it was unable to take
as a result of the late
notice: (1) it was denied an opportunity
to inspect the failed
rod-eye assembly on its own and (2)
it was denied an
opportunity to assert a cross-claim
against Sheffer, the
manufacturer of the rod-eye. We address
in turn, and
reject, both of Hartford's prof fered
grounds for finding
substantial prejudice.
Hartford first alleges that, if
it only had r eceived prompt
notice of the accident, it would have
taken custody of the
failed rod-eye assembly and undertaken
its own full
analysis of it. While it is true that
the failed r od-eye has
been irretrievably lost, it has been
replaced by an
independent professional metallurgist's
comprehensive
laboratory report that seemingly details
all r elevant
characteristics of the rod-eye at the
time of failure. The rod-
eye was fully tested by PSI, and Hartford
has not stated any
additional or different testing it
would have pursued on its
own had it had possession of the rod-eye.
Instead, Hartford
appears to argue that it need not show
how it was
prejudiced by loss of the rod-eye because,
to its way of
thinking, the loss of a piece of physical
evidence will per se
establish substantial prejudice. However
, New Jersey law is
not so generous; as noted, more than
speculation and
conjecture is required to establish
substantial prejudice.
Because Hartford has provided nothing
beyond mere
speculation, it has failed to show
how it might have been
appreciably prejudiced by its failur
e to run its own tests on
the rod-eye assembly.
9
Whether Hartford was prejudiced
by its inability to fully
pursue a cross-claim against Sheffer
is a more difficult
issue, but one that Hartford emphasized
at oral argument.
Hartford maintains that "EDC's
breach of the notice
provision of the Hartford policy also
pr ejudiced Hartford by
reason of EDC's failure to aggressively
pursue a cross-claim
for contractual indemnification from
co-defendant Sheffer."
Appellee's Br. at 20. There are several
problems with this
argument, not the least of which is
the fact that an insurer
who has not paid its insured's claim
or pr ovided the
insured with a defense has no right
to obtain the benefit of
the insured's claims against third
parties. See Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co.
of Hartfor d, 367 A.2d 864,
868 (N.J. 1976); see also In re Joint
Eastern & Southern
Dist. Asbestos Lit., 78 F.3d 764, 779
(2d Cir. 1996). Here,
Hartford received notice of the accident
in March 1998 and
was first sued under its policy with
EDC in May 1998.
Nonetheless, Hartford steadfastly refused
coverage, or even
a defense, to EDC until one week after
a settlement was
agreed to in August 1998. During the
months following
Hartford's initial notification of
the accident, Hartford had
ample opportunity to assist EDC, but
turned down the
chance to do so. Therefore, Hartfor
d lost the right to pursue
a cross-claim against Sheffer as a
r esult of its own inaction,
not by virtue of EDC's action.
Hartford's real problem appears
to lie with EDC's
decision to settle this case, thereby
extinguishing its cross-
claim against Sheffer. However, under
New Jersey law,
when an insurer refuses to defend its
insured, the insured
is free to settle with third parties,
and the settlement may
be enforced against the insurer. See
Griggs v. Bertram, 443
A.2d 163, 171-72 (N.J. 1982).1 Thus,
EDC was free to
_________________________________________________________________
1. We recognize that Hartford of
fered to defend EDC one week after the
settlement was agreed to. However,
this fact is irrelevant to our
discussion. Even if Hartford had been
allowed to defend EDC, subject to
a reservation of rights, EDC would
have been able to enter the same
settlement, for the attorney hired
by an insurance company represents
the insured, not the insurer. See Petty
v. General Accident Fire & Life
Assurance Corp., 365 F.2d 419, 421
(3d Cir. 1966). And "[w]hile the
insurer is not compelled to disregard
its own interests in representing or
defending an insured, the insured's
inter ests must necessarily come
first." Lieberman v. Employers
Insurance of Wausau, 419 A.2d 417, 422-
23 (N.J. 1980). Accordingly, if an
insur ed wants to settle (as did EDC),
the attorney provided by the insur
er must do so, even if the insurer
objects.
10
settle, subject to limited oversight
by Hartfor d. Of course, a
settlement that is unreasonable in
amount or entered into
in bad faith is not enforceable against
Hartfor d, but
Hartford bears the ultimate burden
of showing such
frailties in the settlement. Griggs
v. Bertram , 443 A.2d at
174. Hartford has not met that burden.
Here, EDC was justified, and perhaps
even wise, to settle
in the manner that it did. Under its
contract with NKK,
EDC warranted that it would provide
equipment (including
the rod-eye) that is "of merchantable
quality, free from all
defects in design, material and workmanship
. . . ." Appx.
125. EDC was apparently liable, therefor
e, to NKK for
supplying a defective product, even
if the defect was due
perhaps to Sheffer's manufacturing
err or. Hartford believes,
however, that the indemnification clause
in the boom
cylinder purchase order clearly pr
ovided that Sheffer would
fully indemnify EDC for any damages
arising out of the
defectiveness of the product. The clause
r eads: "[i]f this
Purchase Order involves work to be
per formed by you at a
job site, you, by the acceptance of
this Pur chase Order . . .
agree to indemnify and save EDC incorporated
against all
claims for damages to persons or property
arising out of the
execution of the work." Appx.
140. The indemnification
clause is not as broad as Hartford
claims, for it only
provides for indemnification when damages
arise "out of the
execution of . . . work" done
at a job site. The damage
caused by the failed rod-eye does not
seem to meet these
conditions. Thus, the purchase order's
indemnification
clause does not appear to provide EDC
with any
contractual indemnification. This being
the case, Hartford
has not shown that settlement was unreasonable
because
of the indemnification clause in the
contract between EDC
and Sheffer.
Of course, Sheffer might nonetheless
have emer ged from
a trial with a substantial obligation
of its own, arising out
of a legal duty distinct from the above
indemnification
clause. For example, EDC's cross-claim
against Sheffer
contains the allegation that Sheffer
failed to exercise due
care in manufacturing the rod-eye.
EDC might also have
pursued an express or implied warranty
claim against
Sheffer. If ultimately proven at trial,
these allegations might
11
have led to a significant amount
of contribution from
Sheffer. However, there is no guarantee
that EDC could
successfully prove these allegations
at trial. Such
uncertainty is a classic reason for
settling, and here the
settlement amounts paid by each party
appear to
reasonably reflect the parties' various
responsibilities for
designing, manufacturing and installing
the r od-eye: TFV
agreed to settle a $3.6 million claim
for only $1.85 million,
and of that amount, EDC was responsible
for $1 million,
Sheffer for $500,000 and other parties
for the remaining
$350,000.
Hartford has shown no evidence that
the above amounts
were somehow the result of collusive
conduct or bad faith
dealings between the parties. Indeed,
the best ar gument
Hartford could muster at oral argument
was an appeal to
equity, claiming that it only had two
weeks to consider a
settlement that arose out of a complex
case involving
thousands of pages of documents. Hartford's
ar gument
fails, however, because Hartford certainly
had more than
two weeks to familiarize itself with
this case. EDCfirst sued
Hartford over the insurance policy
in May 1998. At that
time, Hartford learned the facts of
this case and formulated
a litigation strategy based upon them,
for Hartfor d denied
that its policy obligated it to defend
or cover EDC--a
determination that required a familiarity
with the facts and
insurance policy. Consequently, Hartford
had ample time to
learn the facts and legal issues in
this case and cannot now
claim that the settlement is unfair
because it was only
allowed two weeks to make a settlement
decision that all
other parties were apparently able
to make in one day. For
these reasons, we find that the settlement
is reasonable
and the result of good faith dealings
between the parties.
Thus, Hartford has failed to show appreciable
prejudice
arising from the late notice of EDC's
claim that it received.
B. Contract Coverage
Having found that Hartford was not
appr eciably
prejudiced by the late notice, we turn
now to the question
whether the insurance contract provides
coverage of the
rod-eye failure. The contract between
EDC and Hartford
provides up to $2 million of business
liability coverage.2
_________________________________________________________________
2. The relevant provision of the
contract states that "[Hartford] will pay
those sums that [EDC] becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages
12
However, the contract also contains
several standard
exclusions.
The first relevant exclusion addresses
the "products-
completed operations hazard."3
Under this exclusion, the
contract exempts from coverage any
damage arising after
the product or work leaves the insured's
hands. Here, for
example, the "products-completed
operations hazard"
exclusion would act to prevent coverage
of damage arising
from the rod-eye once the rod-eye has
left EDC's control.
However, under the EDC policy, the
"pr oducts-completed
operations hazard" exclusion does
not apply when the work
out of which the damage arises was
perfor med by a
subcontractor.
The second relevant exclusion, entitled
"Exclusion--
Engineers and Architect Professional
Liability," generally
provides that insurance coverage will
not extend to damage
arising out of various professional
services, such as product
design.4 However, as noted by TFV,
"[t]he exclusion for
_________________________________________________________________
because of `bodily injury,' `property
damage,' `personal injury' or
`advertising injury' to which this
insurance applies." Appx. 247 (Business
Liability Coverage Form A.1.a). The
$2 million limit is provided on page
5 of the Spectrum Policy Declarations
in EDC's insurance contract with
Hartford. See Appx. 213.
3. The "products-completed
operations hazard" coverage exclusion states
that the insurance contract does not
extend coverage to " `Property
damage' to `your work' arising out
of it or any part of it and included in
the `products-completed operations
hazar d.' " However, this coverage
exclusion does not apply "if the
damaged work or the work out of which
the damage arises was performed on
your behalf by a subcontractor."
Appx. at 252. (Bus. Liab. Coverage
Form. B.1.m.)
The contract defines "products-completed
operations hazard" to
"include[ ] all `bodily injury'
and`property damage' arising out of `your
product' or `your work' except: (1)
Pr oducts that are still in your physical
possession; or (2) Work that has not
yet been completed or abandoned."
Appx. 260. B.10.a.
4. In full, the exclusion states
that:
This insurance does not apply to
`bodily injury,'`property damage,'
`personal injury' or `advertising injury'
arising out of the rendering or
failure to render any professional
services by or for you, including:
13
professional services is . . . appropriately
associated with a
specialized knowledge and a mental
or intellectual
endeavor, not production, manufactur
e or supply of goods
and manufacturing." Appellant's
Br. at 28 (citing Ostrager
& Newman, Handbook on Insurance
Coverage Disputes,
S 7.02(b)(6) (10th Ed. 1999)). As such,
the exclusion for
professional services precludes coverage
only if the damage
arises out of a faulty design (either
by EDC or Shef fer), as
opposed to faulty manufacture.
We are thus left with the following
after reading the
relevant provisions of the insurance
contract. The general
liability provisions of the contract
clearly cover the damage
arising from the defective rod-eye:
EDC has become legally
obligated to pay damages because of
property damage
arising out of a product that it supplied
and at least
partially designed. However, two contract
exclusions in the
policy must also be considered. Under
one exclusion (for
"products-completed operations
hazar d"), the contract
provides coverage if the accident arose
fr om a defect caused
by Sheffer's manufacture of the rod-eye.
Under the other
exclusion (for "engineers and
architects pr ofessional
liability"), the contract provides
coverage only if the
accident is not attributable to a defect
in EDC's or Sheffer's
design of the rod-eye. Thus, Hartfor
d's liability under the
insurance contract turns on whether
the accident was
caused by a design defect, which would
preclude coverage,
or a manufacturing defect, which would
not pr eclude
coverage.
All of this leaves us with the task
of trying to identify the
defect in the rod-eye that caused it
to fail and the party
responsible for this defect. Perhaps
because they both
believed that this case would be decided
on the issue
whether there was appreciable prejudice,
as it was in the
district court, neither party has developed
the r ecord or
_________________________________________________________________
(1) The preparing, approving, or
failing to prepare or approve maps,
drawings, opinions, reports, surveys,
change or ders, designs or
specifications; and (2) Supervisory,
inspection or engineering
services.
Appx. 269.
14
presented arguments sufficiently
for us to determine fully
the cause of the rod-eye's failure.
Indeed, EDC's own initial
report of the accident, dated April
1995, lists ten possible
causes of failure, including both design
and manufacturing
defects. See Appx. 151. The laboratory
r eport from PSI
indicates that the rod-eye's failure
may be due to the use of
an inferior grade of steel in the manufactur
e of the rod-eye,
but the report is not entirely clear
on its face and requires
expert testimony to explicate it. See
Appx. 159-62. As such,
the precise reason for the rod-eye's
failure is not apparent
from the record on appeal.
Further, from the record, it is
not even clear who
specified how, and from what materials,
the r od-eye should
be built. For example, from the purchase
order, which
refers to a "Sheffer Hydraulic
Boom Hoist Cylinder" and
then provides detailed specifications,
it appears that Sheffer
built a custom version of a conventional
hydraulic cylinder
to EDC's specifications. In addition,
the r ecord does not
reveal whether EDC specified the particular
type of steel
which failed (in which case the type
of steel might be
considered a design defect) and, if
it did, whether Sheffer
manufactured the rod-eye using the
steel specified or,
alternatively, a steel of lower quality
(in which case the type
of steel might be considered a manufacturing
defect).
Accordingly, because the record
is inadequately
developed, we remand for trial (or
possibly a showing on
summary judgment) on the issue whether
the r od-eye
failure was caused by EDC's or Sheffer's
design, which
would presumably preclude coverage
under the insurance
contract, or Sheffer's manufacturing,
which would allow
coverage under the insurance contract.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE
the judgment of the
district court and REMAND for further
proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
15
A True Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court
of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
16
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