FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL; SAN DIEGO BAYKEEPER,
Nos. 99-56532
KENNETH J. MOSER,
9-56545
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
D.C. No.
v.
CV-96-01492-RMB
SOUTHWEST MARINE, INC.,
OPINION
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court
for the Southern District of California
Rudi M. Brewster, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
August 10, 2000--Pasadena, California
Filed December 19, 2000
Before: Alex Kozinski, Susan P.
Graber, and
Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Graber
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
David L. Mulliken and Dorn G. Bishop,
Latham & Watkins,
San Diego, California, for the defendant-appellant.
16150
Charles S. Crandall, San Luis Obispo,
California, for the
plaintiffs-appellees.
Eric L. Garner, Best Best &
Krieger LLP, Riverside, Califor-
nia, for amicus curiae.
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
GRABER, Circuit Judge:
Defendant Southwest Marine, Inc.,
appeals from the district
court's judgment for Plaintiffs Natural
Resources Defense
Council (NRDC), San Diego Baykeeper,
and Kenneth J.
Moser, in their citizen enforcement
action underS 505(a) of
the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C.
S 1365(a). In
response to Defendant's challenge,
we hold: Plaintiffs have
standing to bring this action, Plaintiffs'
notice letter was ade-
quate, Defendant's violations were
ongoing, the district
court's injunctive measures were not
an abuse of discretion,
and the district court's civil penalty
was not an abuse of dis-
cretion. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant operates a large shipyard
on San Diego Bay. Its
principal business is repairing and
maintaining marine ves-
sels. Among other things, Defendant's
shipyard removes old
paint from ships and then repaints
them. Defendant com-
monly removes old paint by blasting
the ships' hulls with
abrasive grit, composed primarily of
particles of copper, that
is conveyed on streams of compressed
air. Defendant uses
about 4 million pounds of copper grit
per year for blasting old
paint from ships and generates about
4,800 pounds of paint
waste per year.
Defendant repaints ships with "antifouling
paints," which
are paints that are formulated to prevent
the growth of aquatic
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organisms, such as barnacles and
algae, on the bottoms of
ships. Those paints contain compounds
that are toxic to
aquatic life.
Defendant's shipyard contains five
piers, at which ships are
moored while they are being repaired,
and two floating dry-
docks, on which ships rest, out of
the water, to allow repair,
blasting, and repainting of parts that
are normally underwater.
When Plaintiffs filed their complaint,
Defendant also was
operating a marine railway, which is
a device that is used to
pull ships onto the shore for repair.
Shipyards like Defendant's generate
large amounts of
wastes and pollutants, including paint
chips and abrasive grit.
Those wastes and pollutants are discharged
into adjacent
waters through -- among other means
-- storm water runoff,
tidal action, leaks, spills, and overspray.
A 1993 report by the
California Regional Water Quality Control
Board showed ele-
vated concentrations of copper, tributyltin,
and zinc -- all of
which are present in the materials
used and the wastes gener-
ated at Defendant's shipyard -- in
the sediments adjacent to
the shipyard. The report concluded
that Defendant appeared
to have discharged copper, tributyltin,
and zinc into San
Diego Bay, that Defendant's management
practices appeared
to be inadequate to prevent such discharges,
and that the dis-
charges might have long-term negative
effects on the water
quality of the Bay and on its suitability
for human use.
Defendant had applied for and received
a National Pollu-
tant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit from the
California Regional Water Quality Control
Board in 1983. In
1992, Defendant had obtained coverage
under the State Water
Resources Control Board's 1991 General
Industrial Permit for
storm water discharges. That permit
supplemented Defen-
dant's NPDES permit; the storm water
permit applied to dis-
charges of pollutants through storm
water, and the NPDES
permit applied to other discharges.
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Both permits required Defendant
to develop and implement
plans to limit its discharges of pollutants
into the Bay. Rather
than relying on specific numerical
effluent limitations, the
permits required Defendant to create
and follow "Best Man-
agement Practices" (BMPs).1 Defendant
adopted a written
BMP plan on January 15, 1992.
The storm water permit also required
Defendant to develop
and implement a Storm Water Pollution
Prevention Plan
(SWPPP) and a Storm Water Pollution
Monitoring Plan
(SWPMP). The permit specified that
the SWPPP was required
to include, among other things:
<!BUL>
a description of sources that might add significant
quantities
of pollutants to storm water discharges;
<!BUL>
a detailed site map;
<!BUL>
a description of materials that had been treated,
stored,
spilled, disposed of, or leaked into storm
water
discharges since November 1988;
<!BUL>
a description of the management practices that
Defendant
employed to minimize contact
_________________________________________________________________
1 BMPs are
schedules
of activities, prohibitions of practices, maintenance
procedures,
and other management practices to prevent or reduce
the
pollution of "waters of the United States. " BMPs also
include
treatment
requirements, operating procedures, and practices to
control
plant site runoff, spillage or leaks, sludge or waste dis-
posal,
or drainage from raw material storage.
40 C.F.R. S 122.2. As described
in Defendant's current NPDES permit,
BMPs may be "structural"
(e.g., tarpaulins and shrouds to enclose work
areas, retention ponds, devices such
as berms to channel water away from
pollutant sources, and treatment facilities)
or "non-structural" (e.g., good
housekeeping, preventive maintenance,
personnel training, inspections,
and record-keeping).
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between
storm water and pollutants from vehi-
cles,
equipment, and materials;
<!BUL>
a description of existing structural and non-
structural
measures to reduce pollutants in storm
water
discharges;
<!BUL>
a description of methods of on-site storage and
disposal
of significant materials;
<!BUL>
a description of outdoor storage, manufacturing,
and
processing activities;
<!BUL>
a list of pollutants likely to be present in signifi-
cant
quantities in storm water discharges and an
estimate
of the annual amounts of those pollu-
tants
in storm water discharge;
<!BUL>
a record of significant leaks or spills of toxic or
hazardous
pollutants to storm water;
<!BUL>
a summary of existing data describing pollutants
in storm
water discharge;
<!BUL>
a description of Defendant's storm water man-
agement
controls, including good housekeeping
procedures,
preventive maintenance, and mea-
sures
to control and treat polluted storm water;
and
<!BUL>
a list of the specific individuals responsible for
developing
and implementing the SWPPP.
Defendant submitted its SWPPP in
December 1992. The
SWPPP required Defendant, among other
things, (1) to per-
form daily inspections to ensure that
its shipyard was comply-
ing with the requirements of its BMP
plan, and (2) to maintain
records of those inspections.
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On April 30, 1996, Plaintiffs sent
Defendant a notice letter,
as required by 33 U.S.C. S 1365(b)(1)(A),
advising Defendant
that it was violating the CWA and that
Plaintiffs intended to
sue under the CWA's citizen enforcement
provisions. A copy
of the notice letter and its attachments
appears as an Appendix
at the end of this opinion.
As discussed below, a party who
wishes to sue under the
CWA's citizen enforcement provisions
may not commence an
action until at least 60 days after
giving notice of intent to sue.
On August 27, 1996, more than 60 days
after sending their
notice letter, Plaintiffs filed this
action. Four days earlier, on
August 23, 1996, Defendant had submitted
a revised SWPPP
and SWPMP. Those revised plans addressed,
and attempted
to correct, many of the shortcomings
described in Plaintiffs'
notice letter.
In September 1996, Defendant moved
to dismiss this
action, arguing that Plaintiffs' notice
letter did not comply
with the CWA's requirements and, in
particular, that the letter
was not specific enough to inform Defendant
of what stan-
dards it allegedly had violated. The
district court denied
Defendant's motion in a published opinion.
Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Southwest Marine,
Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1330
(S.D. Cal. 1996).
Defendant then moved for summary
judgment, arguing (1)
that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction
because Plaintiffs' allegations of
ongoing violations were nei-
ther made in good faith nor based on
reasonable investigation;
(2) that, even if the district court
had subject matter jurisdic-
tion, summary judgment was appropriate
because Plaintiffs
could not prove ongoing violations
at trial; and (3) that Plain-
tiffs' claims were moot.
After continuing the motion to allow
more time for discov-
ery, the district court denied summary
judgment in an unpub-
lished order. In denying Defendant's
motion, the court
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concluded (1) that it had subject
matter jurisdiction because
Plaintiffs had alleged continuing violations
in good faith; (2)
that there were disputed issues of
material fact as to whether
Defendant (a) had developed an adequate
SWPPP and moni-
toring plan, as required by its storm
water permit, and (b) had
adequately implemented or was adequately
implementing
such plans; and (3) that Plaintiffs'
action was not moot.
While district court proceedings
were pending, Defendant's
permits were revised twice. First,
Defendant's storm water
permit was superseded by a new storm
water permit, which
took effect May 1, 1997. Second, both
the storm water permit
and Defendant's NPDES permit were superseded
by a new
NPDES permit. That permit was issued
on October 15, 1997,
but was stayed on March 27, 1998, by
the Superior Court of
the County of San Diego. The superior
court lifted that stay
later in 1998, and the revised permit
became effective at that
time.2
Defendant also revised a number
of its practices related to
storm water while this matter was before
the district court.
Among other things, Defendant revised
its BMP plan, as
required by its most recent NPDES permit;
installed a storm
water diversion system covering most
(but not all) of its facil-
ity; hired a new environmental compliance
manager; installed
a roof to prevent storm water from
reaching hazardous materi-
als; and removed polluted sediments
from the area of its
marine railways.
This action was tried to the court
between November 3 and
December 3, 1998. Both sides presented
evidence and expert
testimony about conditions at Defendant's
facility, and the
district court made three visits to
the facility.
_________________________________________________________________
2 Defendant has operated under three
storm water permits during the
pendency of this litigation. The provisions
of those permits that Defendant
was found to have violated, and to
which we refer in this opinion, have
remained essentially consistent in
all three permits.
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On March 2, 1999, the district court
found in Plaintiffs'
favor in an unpublished order. After
reaffirming its earlier rul-
ings that Plaintiffs had standing and
that the notice letter was
adequate, the court concluded (1) that
Defendant's SWPPP
and monitoring plan, as revised in
August 1996, were ade-
quate; but (2) that Defendant had failed
to implement those
plans adequately, thereby violating
its permit and the CWA.
The court imposed injunctive relief
and a civil penalty of
$799,000.
The district court then asked Plaintiffs
to prepare proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of
law. Plaintiffs submitted
proposed findings on May 7, 1999, and
Defendants filed
objections thereto. The district court
held hearings on July 13
and August 19, 1999, to consider Defendant's
objections.
Defendant argued, among other things,
that the district court's
proposed injunction was too broad and
too costly. To address
those arguments, the district court
asked the parties to submit
additional evidence concerning the
proposed injunction.
On September 7, 1999, the district
court issued its findings
of fact and conclusions of law. The
court found: (1) that
Plaintiffs had presented "convincing
evidence " that Defendant
had not made the required inspections
that it claimed to have
made; (2) that, even accepting Defendant's
statement that it
had made the required inspections,
Defendant had not main-
tained adequate records of those inspections,
with the result
that a large number of inspection reports
were missing; (3)
that the reports that Defendant had
provided demonstrated a
pattern of poor housekeeping at Defendant's
facility and
showed that violations, when reported,
were not always reme-
died in a timely manner; (4) that Defendant's
inadequate
implementation of its plans had led
to "significant contribu-
tions of pollutants to Defendant's
leasehold"; (5) that Defen-
dant's leasehold within the Bay was
"devoid of life"; (6) that
the evidence conclusively demonstrated
that substantial quan-
tities of pollutants from Defendant's
paint-blasting operations
had entered San Diego Bay in Defendant's
storm water dis-
16157
charges; (7) that Defendant's failure
to implement its storm
water plans adequately was contributing
to and perpetuating
the contamination of its marine leasehold;
and (8) that the
harm to Defendant's leasehold "could
be remedied by Defen-
dant with improved practices."
Based on those findings, the
court concluded: (1) that it had subject
matter jurisdiction
over the action; (2) that Plaintiffs
had standing; (3) that
Defendant had violated, and was continuing
to violate, the rel-
evant permits and plans; and (4) that
Defendant's failure to
implement its plans adequately was
the result of "systemic
problems" and "overall inadequacies"
in implementation,
rather than mere "snapshots"
of isolated violations.
The district court's findings of
fact and conclusions of law
also reiterated the injunctive relief
and civil penalties that the
court had imposed in its earlier order.
In response to Defen-
dant's objections, the court entered
a limited stay governing
several provisions of the injunction,
to allow the parties to
submit further studies and evidence.
On March 6, 2000, the
district court held its final hearing
regarding the limited stay.
After making minor changes to the injunction,
the court lifted
the stay in an unpublished order dated
March 7, 2000.
In its injunction, the court ordered
Defendant (1) to test its
storm water discharges for significant
pollutants before
releasing them into the Bay; (2) to
sweep, after every shift,
uncontained areas in which operations
may have caused
deposits of debris and to provide mats
and air hoses so that
workers could clean their shoes after
leaving such areas; (3)
to make daily inspections of its facilities
(except when the
shipyard is not operating) and keep
records of those inspec-
tions; (4) to test the water column
around each vessel that is
being blasted or painted to determine
if those operations are
contributing to pollution in the Bay;
(5) to correct conditions
that might allow pollutants to enter
the Bay, within four hours
if feasible; (6) to repair or replace
shrouds that are in poor
repair; (7) to capture all storm water
coming off its piers (the
district court allowed Defendant 18
months to comply with
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this condition); and (8) to erect
and maintain concrete berms
in areas of the facility from which
runoff might enter the Bay.
The court rejected Plaintiffs' argument
that Defendant should
be required to remediate the contamination
of the sediments
in its marine leasehold.
This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant challenges the district
court's rulings on (1)
standing, (2) the adequacy of Plaintiffs'
notice letter, (3)
ongoing violations, (4) the terms of
the injunction, and (5) the
civil penalty. We will address each
of those issues in turn.
I. Standing
First, Defendant argues that the
district court erred in hold-
ing that Plaintiffs had standing to
bring this action. We review
de novo the question whether a party
has standing to bring an
action. LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d
1146, 1152 (9th Cir.
2000).
[1] In order to satisfy Article
III's standing requirements in
a CWA citizen enforcement action, "a
plaintiff must show (1)
it has suffered an `injury in fact'
that is (a) concrete and par-
ticularized and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the chal-
lenged action of the defendant; and
(3) it is likely. . . that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision. " Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.,
Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693,
704 (2000). An association like NRDC
"has standing to bring
suit on behalf of its members when
its members would other-
wise have standing to sue in their
own right, the interests at
stake are germane to the organization's
purpose, and neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the partici-
pation of individual members in the
lawsuit." Id..
16159
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs
cannot satisfy any of the
three requirements for Article III
standing. We disagree.
[2] First, Plaintiffs showed "injury
in fact." The Supreme
Court has held that "environmental
plaintiffs adequately
allege injury in fact when they aver
that they use the affected
area and are persons `for whom the
aesthetic and recreational
values of the area will be lessened'
by the challenged activi-
ty." Id. at 705 (quoting Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
735 (1972)). Here, members of the plaintiff
organizations, and
individual plaintiff Kenneth Moser,
testified that they have
derived recreational and aesthetic
benefit from their use of the
Bay (including areas of the Bay next
to Defendant's ship-
yard), but that their use has been
curtailed because of their
concerns about pollution, contaminated
fish, and the like.
Those averments are sufficient to satisfy
the "injury in fact"
component of Article III standing.
[3] Second, the injury is "fairly
traceable" to the challenged
activity. This requirement, more precisely,
is that there must
be "a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct
complained of -- the injury has to
be `fairly .. . trace[able]
to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not .. . th[e]
result [of] the independent action
of some third party not
before the court.' " Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992) (quoting Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). Plaintiffs
presented evi-
dence that the sediments in Defendant's
marine leasehold
contained elevated concentrations of
pollutants, that Defen-
dant had discharged the same pollutants,
and that Defendant's
marine leasehold was "devoid of
life." That evidence was suf-
ficient to demonstrate that Plaintiffs'
injury was "fairly trace-
able" to Defendant's conduct.
As the Fourth Circuit has
noted, the threshold requirement of
"traceability does not
mean that plaintiffs must show to a
scientific certainty that
defendant's effluent . . . caused the
precise harm suffered by
the plaintiffs" in order to establish
standing. Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling
Corp., 204 F.3d 149,
16160
161 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citations
and internal quotation
marks omitted). To satisfy this requirement,
"[r]ather than
pinpointing the origins of particular
molecules, a plaintiff
must merely show that a defendant discharges
a pollutant that
causes or contributes to the kinds
of injuries alleged in the
specific geographic area of concern."
Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also
Sierra Club v. Cedar Point
Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 558 (5th Cir.
1996) (to the same effect);
Public Interest Research Group of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Powell
Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64,
72 (3d Cir. 1990)
(same). Plaintiffs made that showing
in this case.
[4] Third, Plaintiffs demonstrated
that a favorable decision
would redress their injuries. A plaintiff
who seeks injunctive
relief satisfies the requirement of
redressability by alleging a
continuing violation or the imminence
of a future violation of
an applicable statute or standard.
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for
a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 108 (1998).
Plaintiffs alleged that
Defendant was continuing to violate
its permits; what is more,
as discussed below, they proved continuing
violations at trial.
Because they sought an injunction to
halt those continuing
violations, Plaintiffs satisfied the
requirement of redressa-
bility.
In sum, the district court did not
err in holding that Plain-
tiffs had standing to bring this action.
II. Notice -- Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs'
notice letter was
insufficient. Under the CWA,
No action may be commenced--
(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section--
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given
notice
of the alleged violation (i) to the Administra-
16161
tor,
(ii) to the State in which the alleged violation
occurs,
and (iii) to any alleged violator of the stan-
dard,
limitation, or order . . . .
33 U.S.C. S 1365(b). The applicable
regulation provides that
the notice
shall
include sufficient information to permit the
recipient
to identify the specific standard, limitation,
or order
alleged to have been violated, the activity
alleged
to constitute a violation, the person or per-
sons
responsible for the alleged violation, the loca-
tion
of the alleged violation, the date or dates of such
violation,
and the full name, address, and telephone
number
of the person giving notice.
40 C.F.R. S 135.3(a).
If a party seeking to bring a citizen
enforcement action has
not complied with the CWA's notice
requirement, then the
district court in which that action
is brought lacks subject mat-
ter jurisdiction and must dismiss the
action. Washington Trout
v. McCain Foods, Inc., 45 F.3d 1351,
1354 (9th Cir. 1995);
see also Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,
493 U.S. 20, 26
(1989) (requiring strict compliance
with notice requirement
for citizen enforcement action under
the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act). "In practical
terms, the notice must
be sufficiently specific to inform
the alleged violator about
what it is doing wrong, so that it
will know what corrective
actions will avert a lawsuit."
Atlantic States Legal Found.,
Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116
F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.
1997). We review de novo the district
court's conclusion that
Plaintiffs' notice was adequate. See
Washington Trout, 45
F.3d at 1353.
The district court treated Plaintiffs'
notice letter as alleging
two separate, but related, violations
concerning the pollution
prevention plans required by its permits
and the CWA. The
16162
first was Defendant's failure to
prepare adequate plans; the
second was Defendant's failure to implement
adequate plans.
With regard to those issues, Plaintiffs'
notice letter clearly
satisfies some of the requirements
of notice. The letter was
mailed to the appropriate entities.
See 40 C.F.R. S 135.3(a). It
identified the persons giving notice
and the persons responsi-
ble for the alleged violation. Although
the letter did not iden-
tify a specific date, or a specific
location within Southwest
Marine's facility, it nevertheless
satisfied those requirements
as well. See id. Plaintiffs were not
alleging that a particular
discharge from a particular pipe on
a particular day had vio-
lated the CWA. Rather, they were alleging
that Defendant had
failed to prepare and implement plans
that were required by
its permit. As the district court correctly
noted, the failure to
develop and implement pollution prevention
plans are viola-
tions "occurring at the facility
in general." Southwest Marine,
945 F. Supp. at 1333. Moreover, "the
deficiencies in these
plans are ongoing, so there is no specific
date that can be
alleged as the date of the violation."
Id.
The parties' dispute before us centers
on the specificity of
the notice letter. See 40 C.F.R. 135.3(a)
(requiring that a
notice letter "include sufficient
information to permit the
recipient to identify the specific
standard, limitation, or order
alleged to have been violated, [and]
the activity alleged to
constitute a violation"). The
notice letter generally raises the
issues of the preparation and implementation
of an adequate
SWPPP. Our first question is whether
the notice letter raised
those issues adequately to satisfy
the requirements of the
CWA.
As to the alleged failure to prepare
an adequate plan, the
notice letter was clearly adequate,
and we do not understand
Defendant to argue otherwise. The letter
charged, among
other things, that Defendant had failed
to prepare an SWPPP
that complied with the specific requirements
of Defendant's
storm water permit; identified the
source of the requirement
16163
that Defendant prepare an adequate
SWPPP; and explained
the ways in which Defendant's then-existing
SWPPP did not
comply with the storm water permit.
Defendant argues, however, that
the notice letter was not
sufficient with regard to Plaintiffs'
allegation that it failed to
implement an adequate plan. Specifically,
Defendant asserts
that the district court lacked jurisdiction
to consider Plaintiffs'
allegations of "poor housekeeping."
The notice letter alleges
that Defendant failed to implement
an adequate SWPPP,
including a "good housekeeping"
provision."Good house-
keeping" was required under Defendant's
storm water per-
mits. Defendant acknowledges that the
court's reference to
"poor housekeeping" does
"arguably correspond" to Plain-
tiffs' reference to storm water controls
and good housekeep-
ing in Attachment 2 of the notice letter.
See Appendix A at
Attachment 2, page 1.
Nevertheless, Defendant argues that
Plaintiffs failed to
refer to, or identify, the "good
housekeeping " provision of its
revised SWPPP and, thus, failed to
provide any information
about how Defendant had violated that
specific plan provi-
sion. The difficulty with that argument
is that the notice letter
predates the plan provisions to which
Defendant refers. Plain-
tiffs mailed their notice letter in
April 1996. The "good house-
keeping" provision to which Defendant
refers, and which
Defendant cites in its brief, is contained
in Defendant's
revised SWPPP, which was filed in August
1996. Although
we require strict compliance with the
CWA's notice require-
ment, we do not require citizen-plaintiffs
to refer to provisions
of plans that do not exist.
We hold that the notice letter was
sufficient, on the date it
was mailed, to allow the district court
to exercise jurisdiction
over Plaintiffs' "good housekeeping"
claims. Defendant was
operating under a storm water permit
that was designed to
prevent discharges of toxic pollutants
through storm water.
That permit required Defendant to prepare
and implement an
16164
SWPPP that included a "good
housekeeping" provision. The
permit explained that "[g]ood
housekeeping requires the
maintenance of clean, orderly facility
areas that discharge
storm water. Material handling areas
shall be inspected and
cleaned to reduce the potential for
pollutants to enter the
storm water conveyance system."
Plaintiffs' notice letter suf-
ficiently alleged that Defendant had
failed to prepare and
implement such a plan.
And Defendant obviously understood
at least some of the
alleged violations. In response to
Plaintiffs' letter, Defendant
completely revised its SWPPP and SWPMP
within four
months, adding sections that specifically
made reference to
the requirements that Plaintiffs had
identified. See Atlantic
States, 116 F.3d at 820 (concluding
that notice was suffi-
ciently specific where the defendant,
after receiving notice,
took immediate steps to cure the problems
identified in the
notice letter). And, as noted, Defendant
made substantial
changes to its facility and operations
during the pendency of
this litigation, concededly in an attempt
to remedy some of
the inadequacies of which Plaintiffs
had complained.
The second and more theoretical
question that Defendant's
argument raises is what, if any, effect
Defendant's post-notice
alterations of its plans and facilities
had on the adequacy of
the notice letter. If a defendant receives
a proper notice letter
alleging that it has failed to prepare
and implement an ade-
quate plan and, in response, prepares
a new plan and begins
to implement it before the complaint
is filed, is the otherwise
proper notice letter defective for
failing to identify and dis-
cuss the new plan and its implementation?
In those circum-
stances, must a citizen-plaintiff send
a new notice letter? We
think not. Subject matter jurisdiction
is established by provid-
ing a notice that is adequate on the
date it is given to the
defendant. The defendant's later changes
to its operations and
plans may affect standing, see Steel
Co., 523 U.S. at 105-06;
the question of ongoing violations
or remedies, see Gwaltney
of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc. , 484 U.S.
16165
49, 64 (1987); or mootness, see
Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. at 708.3
But such changes do not retroactively
divest a district court of
jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. S 1365(b).
Defendant also cites Washington
Trout and Hallstrom in
support of its argument that notice
was inadequate. Those
cases are distinguishable from this
one. In Washington Trout
and Hallstrom, the plaintiffs had failed
to comply with the
facial requirements for notice set
out in the applicable statutes
and regulations.
In Washington Trout, the plaintiffs
mailed the defendant a
letter alleging improper discharges
of pollutants; however,
"the letter did not provide the
address and phone number of
the named plaintiff, nor did it furnish
the identity, address,
and phone number of [the other plaintiffs].
" 45 F.3d at 1352.
Further, "the notice failed to
specifically identify the dates" of
the allegedly unlawful discharges.
Id. This court held that
those failures to comply with 40 C.F.R.
S 135.3(a) precluded
the district court from assuming jurisdiction
over any part of
the plaintiffs' action. Id. at 1354-55.
In Hallstrom, the plaintiffs filed
a citizen enforcement
action under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act,
which contains a notice provision that
is substantively identi-
cal to the CWA's notice provision.
See 42 U.S.C. S 6972(b).
The Supreme Court held that the district
court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs'
action because the
plaintiffs had failed to give any notice
to the EPA or to the
appropriate state agency as S 6972(b)
requires. See Hallstrom,
493 U.S. at 33.
_________________________________________________________________
3 Using Defendant's corrective actions
as evidence of its understanding
of Plaintiffs' letter might seem to
suggest a strategy of avoiding remedial
measures so as not to create unfavorable
evidence. Such corrective
actions, however, would benefit a defendant
on issues of standing, moot-
ness, and remedy, as illustrated by
the cases cited in the text.
16166
Those cases establish that the CWA's
notice requirement is
strictly construed and that compliance
with the notice require-
ment is a prerequisite to a citizen
enforcement action. But this
case presents a different problem.
Unlike in Washington Trout
and Hallstrom, the question in this
case is not whether the dis-
trict court had subject matter jurisdiction
over any part of
Plaintiffs' action; Defendant does
not contest that the notice
was adequate as to the allegation that
it had failed to prepare
an adequate SWPPP. Rather, the question
is whether the dis-
trict court exercised jurisdiction
over particular issues that
were not raised in the notice letter
and, thus, were beyond the
scope of the court's jurisdiction.
We have resolved that question in
Plaintiffs' favor. As dis-
cussed above, we hold that Plaintiffs'
letter gave Defendant
adequate notice of all the claims over
which the district court
exercised jurisdiction. Accordingly,
the district court did not
err in concluding that Plaintiffs'
notice letter satisfied the
requirements of 33 U.S.C. S 1365(b).
III. Evidence of Ongoing Violations
Next, Defendant argues that the
district court erred in con-
cluding that it had committed "ongoing
violations " of require-
ments in its storm water permit. We
review findings of fact
for clear error and conclusions of
law de novo. Russian River
Watershed Prot. Comm. v. City of Santa
Rosa, 142 F.3d 1136,
1140 (9th Cir. 1998). We review de
novo a district court's
interpretation of an NPDES permit when
its terms are unam-
biguous. Id. at 1141.
[5] The CWA "does not permit
citizen suits for wholly past
violations"; rather, the statute
"confers jurisdiction over citi-
zen suits when the citizen-plaintiffs
make a good-faith allega-
tion of continuous or intermittent
violation." Gwaltney, 484
U.S. at 64. Here, the district court
properly concluded that
Plaintiffs had made such good-faith
allegations and thereby
16167
had satisfied Gwaltney's threshold
requirement for jurisdic-
tion.
[6] To prevail at trial, a citizen-plaintiff
must prove that
ongoing violations actually have occurred.
"[A ] citizen plain-
tiff may prove ongoing violations `either
(1) by proving viola-
tions that continue on or after the
date the complaint is filed,
or (2) by adducing evidence from which
a reasonable trier of
fact could find a continuing likelihood
of a recurrence in
intermittent or sporadic violations.'
" Sierra Club v. Union
Oil Co., 853 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir.
1988) (quoting Chesa-
peake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney
of Smithfield, Ltd., 844
F.2d 170, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988)).
This court also has adopted
the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that
" `[i]ntermittent or spo-
radic violations do not cease to be
ongoing until the date
when there is no real likelihood of
repetition .' [Chesapeake
Bay Found., 844 F.2d] at 172 (emphasis
added)." Id.
[7] Defendant groups three arguments
under this heading.
First, Defendant argues that the district
court erred in holding
that it had violated any condition
of its storm water permit.
We disagree. As noted, the district
court found that Defendant
had failed to make -- or had failed
to keep records of --
numerous daily inspections of its facility.
Those daily inspec-
tions -- and records of the inspections
-- were required by
Defendant's 1992 and 1996 SWPPPs. The
SWPPPs, in turn,
were required by Defendant's storm
water permit, which con-
templated that Defendant would inspect
its facility and keep
records of its inspections. The district
court also found that
the inspection reports that Defendant
did produce revealed "a
pattern of poor housekeeping."
Defendant's own inspection
reports showed that the "good
housekeeping" standard was
not met uniformly and that violations
were not always reme-
died quickly.
[8] Moreover, the district court
found that Defendant's fail-
ure adequately to implement its SWPPP
"led to significant
contributions of pollutants" to
the Bay from Defendant's dis-
16168
charges. The court further found
that those discharges contrib-
uted to the contamination of Defendant's
marine leasehold
and that the leasehold is "devoid
of life." Those findings are
supported by evidence and, accordingly,
are not clearly erro-
neous. Each of Defendant's successive
storm water permits
has specifically prohibited discharges
that cause adverse
effects on the environment. For example,
Defendant's current
storm water permit prohibits discharges
that degrade marine
communities, cause adverse effects
on the environment, or
result in harmful concentrations of
pollutants in marine sedi-
ments. Because the district court found
that Defendant's fail-
ure to implement its storm water plans
led to discharges that
violated those standards, the court's
conclusion that Defen-
dant violated its storm water permit
was not error.
Second, Defendant argues, "[e]ven
assuming arguendo that
Southwest Marine did not, at some point
in time, implement
its stormwater plans adequately, it
was legal error for the dis-
trict court to find an ongoing violation
of that permit require-
ment." (Emphasis in original.)
As a threshold matter, we
reject Defendant's argument that we
review this question for
legal error. The district court's conclusion
that Defendant's
violations were ongoing was a finding
of fact, which we must
affirm unless clearly erroneous. See
Union Oil , 853 F.2d at
671 (stating that a plaintiff could
prove a continuing violation
"by adducing evidence from which
a reasonable trier of fact
could find a continuing likelihood
of a recurrence in intermit-
tent or sporadic violations").
[9] Here, the district court found
that Defendant had failed
to implement its plans adequately even
after Plaintiffs filed
their complaint. As the district court
noted, there is evidence
of incidents of poor housekeeping during
the pendency of this
action. Defendant argues that the district
court's finding of an
ongoing violation "improperly
combines several discrete and
unrelated workplace incidents."
But the district court found
that the ongoing violations "present[ed]
a picture of overall
inadequacies," not mere "snapshots."
Notwithstanding Defen-
16169
dant's argument, we may not disturb
that finding if it is sup-
ported by evidence. And it is; the
evidence on which the
district court relied was sufficient
to permit a reasonable trier
of fact to find "a continuing
likelihood of a recurrence in
intermittent or sporadic violations."
Union Oil, 853 F.2d at
671. Accordingly, the district court's
finding of a continuing
violation was not clearly erroneous.
Third, Defendant argues that, even
if there is sufficient evi-
dence in the record to establish an
ongoing violation of the
permit, we should nevertheless remand
for the district court
to explain further the factual and
legal basis for its decision.
Because we conclude that the district
court has provided suffi-
cient factual and legal support for
its decision, we do not
agree that remand is necessary or appropriate.
IV. The Injunction
[10] Next, Defendant argues that
the injunction was
improper. District courts have "broad
latitude in fashioning
equitable relief when necessary to
remedy an established
wrong." Alaska Ctr. for the Env't
v. Browner , 20 F.3d 981,
986 (9th Cir. 1994). We review a district
court's decision to
issue an injunction under the CWA,
and its determination of
the scope of that injunction, for abuse
of discretion. See Natu-
ral Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Texaco
Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 906
F.2d 934, 937 (3d Cir. 1990) (so holding);
see also Weinber-
ger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305,
320 (1982) (describing
decision to award or deny injunction
as an exercise of a dis-
trict court's equitable discretion).
Defendant contends that the district
court abused its discre-
tion by imposing requirements that
are not contained in
Defendant's permits or plans. By so
doing, Defendant argues,
the district court essentially overrode
the existing permits.
According to Defendant, that was improper
for two reasons:
(1) it was an abuse of discretion,
and (2) it violated principles
of separation of powers by usurping
the authority of the
16170
executive-branch agencies that issued
the permits. Because
those arguments both turn on the underlying
question whether
the district court overrode Defendant's
existing permits, we
address the arguments together.
[11] Defendant is correct that a
district court's equitable
powers under the CWA are limited to
enforcing standards,
limitations, and orders that have been
violated. 33 U.S.C.
S 1365(a). That enforcement authority
does not allow equita-
ble measures that are wholly unrelated
to a violation of an
existing standard, limitation, or order.
Nor may a district court
exercise its general equitable authority
to override the terms
of a properly issued permit. See City
of Milwaukee v. States
of Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S.
304, 320 (1981) ("Federal
courts lack authority to impose more
stringent effluent limita-
tions under federal common law than
those imposed by the
agency charged by Congress with administering
this compre-
hensive scheme.").
[12] But here the district court
permissibly found violations
of extant permits. The key question
is what a district court
may do, pursuant to its equitable powers,
in aid of enforcing
standards, limitations, and orders
that have been violated.
According to Defendant, a court
may do little more than
tell the violator to comply with the
applicable requirements.
Thus, Defendant says, the district
court in this case should
have "simply order[ed] Southwest
Marine to comply with
specifically-identified pollution plan
provisions."
[13] We do not agree that a district
court's equitable
authority is so cramped. The authority
to "enforce" an exist-
ing requirement is more than the authority
to declare that the
requirement exists and repeat that
it must be followed. So
long as the district court's equitable
measures are reasonably
calculated to "remedy an established
wrong," they are not an
abuse of discretion. Alaska Ctr., 20
F.3d at 986.
16171
[14] We conclude that the injunctive
measures satisfy that
standard. Those measures all are consistent
with, and comple-
mentary to, existing permit requirements.
The requirement
that Defendant's employees sweep open
areas where debris
may have accumulated (or certify that
there was no debris to
sweep) and wipe their feet on mats
after leaving such areas is
a good housekeeping measure designed
to remove pollutants
from areas where storm water accumulates,
as contemplated
in Defendant's permits; the requirement
that Defendant fix
and maintain its shrouds is consistent
with the permit require-
ment for structural BMPs, such as shrouds,
that provide over-
head coverage; the requirement that
Defendant install
concrete berms is consistent with the
requirement for struc-
tural BMPs, such as berms, that channel
or route storm water
away from sources of pollutants; the
requirement that Defen-
dant conduct water-column testing around
each vessel that is
being blasted or painted is consistent
with the permit require-
ments for storm-water monitoring; the
requirement that
Defendant make daily inspections and
keep records of those
inspections is consistent with numerous
permit requirements
requiring monitoring and record-keeping
(and, further, is
almost identical to a provision in
Defendant's original BMP
plan); the requirement that Defendant
correct potentially dan-
gerous conditions within four hours,
if feasible, is consistent
with permit requirements for prompt
response in cases of
leaks and spills; and the requirements
that Defendant capture
storm water coming off piers and test
storm water discharges
before releasing them into the Bay
are consistent with the
requirement that Defendant not discharge
storm water that
adversely affects the environment or
degrades marine com-
munities on Defendant's leasehold,
which the district court
found had been rendered devoid of life
by (among other
things) Defendant's discharges.
The injunctive measures are consistent
with the terms of
Defendant's storm water permits and
seek to enforce the
requirements of those permits and the
relevant plans. They are
not identical to the requirements of
the plans and permits, but
16172
complement those requirements. In
imposing those injunctive
measures, the district court did not
override agency determi-
nations or supersede existing permit
requirements. Rather, it
properly exercised its equitable authority
to enforce existing
requirements with which Defendant had
failed to comply.
Our conclusion that those provisions
of the injunction were
consistent with Defendant's storm water
permit also disposes
of Defendant's separation-of-powers
argument. Because the
district court merely enforced the
permits, it did not "usurp"
the authority of the executive branch.
Defendant also argues that the district
court failed to bal-
ance the equities or make the necessary
findings before issu-
ing its injunction. We are unpersuaded.
The district court
considered Defendant's testimony concerning
the cost and
difficulty of the various injunctive
measures. The district
court also heard testimony throughout
the trial about the
extreme degree of environmental degradation
in the Bay in
general, and on Defendant's leasehold
in particular. The court
temporarily stayed the injunction to
allow further argument
and evidence, and eventually modified
the original injunction
with respect to testing, containment
of runoff, and cleanup.
Finally, in its order lifting the temporary
stay, the court noted
that it was mindful of the cost that
it was imposing on Defen-
dant, but concluded that the cost was
outweighed by the need
for swift corrective action and the
fragility of the local marine
environment. The district court's findings
and balancing of
the equities were adequate to justify
its injunction.
[15] In sum, we conclude that the
district court's injunction
was not an abuse of discretion. We
also conclude that the
injunction did not violate the separation-of-powers
doctrine.
Therefore, we affirm the injunction
in its entirety.
V. Civil Penalties
Finally, Defendant argues that the
district court abused its
discretion in imposing a civil penalty
of $799,000, because
16173
the penalty is excessive, unreasonable,
and unsupported by
evidence. We review for abuse of discretion
the amount of a
civil penalty under the CWA. Leslie
Salt Co. v. United States,
55 F.3d 1388, 1397 (9th Cir. 1995).
The district court imposed the penalty
pursuant to 33
U.S.C. S 1319(d), which provides, as
relevant:"Any person
who violates . . . any permit condition
or limitation . . . shall
be subject to a civil penalty not to
exceed $25,000 per day for
each violation." If a district
court finds a violation, then civil
penalties under 33 U.S.C. S 1319(d)
are mandatory. Leslie
Salt, 55 F.3d at 1397. A district court
has discretion to set the
amount of a penalty (up to the statutory
maximum) and is
instructed to consider the seriousness
of the violation, any
economic benefit that resulted from
the violation, any history
of violations by the party to be penalized,
that party's good-
faith efforts to comply with the applicable
requirements, the
economic effect of the penalty on the
violator, and "such
other matters as justice may require."
33 U.S.C.S 1319(d).
The district court found that Defendant
had been in viola-
tion of the CWA for 799 days when the
trial began and, after
considering the statutory factors,
imposed a penalty of $1,000
for each of the 799 days of violation.
However, the court also
ordered that the penalty will be reduced
by the amount of the
cost of any actions that Defendant
takes to improve its storm
water diversion system and any changes
that Defendant
makes to its facilities to comply with
the court's injunction.
Thus, the amount of the penalty
actually is $799,000 minus
the cost of such physical alterations.
In challenging the
injunction, Defendant presented evidence
that one such alter-
ation -- the installation of a storm-water
diversion system --
would cost more than $1 million by
itself. Accordingly, antici-
pated alterations, when offset against
the $799,000 civil pen-
alty, will reduce the penalty to zero.
In the circumstances, we
cannot agree that the penalty is excessive,
and we hold that
the district court did not abuse its
discretion.
16174
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM
the district court's
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, the
injunction, and the civil
penalty.
16175
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