The following are digests and links to Supreme
Court cases concerning admiralty and maritime law issued during the period
1980 through 1989.
1980 - 1981
- 1982 - 1983 - 1985
- 1986 - 1987 - 1989
Chesapeake
& Ohio R. Co. v. Schwalb, 493 U.S. 40 (1989)
Longshore & Harbor Workers' Act:
since employment that is maritime within the meaning of 33 U.S.C. 902(3)
includes not only the specified occupations or employees who physically
handle cargo, but also land-based activity occurring within the relevant
situs if it is an integral or essential part of loading or unloading a
vessel, employees who are injured while maintaining or repairing equipment
essential to the loading or unloading process are covered by the Act.
Lauro
Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989)
Procedure: an interlocutory order
denying a defendant's motion to dismiss a damages action on the basis of
a contractual forum-selection clause is not immediately appealable under
1291. Such an order is not final in the usual sense, for it does not end
the litigation on the merits but, on the contrary, ensures that the litigation
will continue.
Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. 428 (1989)
Foreign Sovereign Immunity: the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") provides the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state in United States courts, and the District
Court correctly dismissed the action because the FSIA did not authorize
jurisdiction over the petitioner Argentine Republic where it is alleged
that it attacked and severely damaged a crude oil tanker owned by respondent
in international waters during the war between Great Britain and petitioner
Argentine Republic over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
Welch
v. Texas Highways & Public Transportation Dept., 483 U.S. 468 (1987)
Jones Act/Procedure (State Sovereign Immunity):
Congress has not expressed in unmistakable statutory language its intention
to allow States to be sued in federal court under the Jones Act. Although
the Act extends to "[a]ny" injured seaman, this general authorization is
not the kind of unequivocal statutory language that is sufficient to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment, which marks a constitutional distinction between
the States and other employers of seamen.
Offshore
Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986)
Death on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA"):
neither the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA") nor DOHSA requires
or permits the application of the Louisiana wrongful death statute in this
case so as to entitle respondents to recover nonpecuniary damages under
that statute.
East
River S. S. Co. v. Transamerica Delaaval, 476 U.S. 858 (1986)
Products Liability: admiralty law,
which already recognizes a general theory of liability for negligence,
also incorporates principles of products liability, including strict liability.
But whether stated in negligence or strict liability, no products-liability
claim lies in admiralty when a commercial party alleges injury only to
the product itself resulting in purely economic loss. Such a claim is most
naturally understood as a warranty claim.
NLRB
v. International Longshoremen's Assoc., 473 U.S. 61 (1985)
Labor Law: the Rules on Containers,
which require that some cargo containers owned or leased by marine shipping
companies that otherwise would be loaded or unloaded within the local port
area (defined as anywhere within a 50-mile radius of the port) instead
must be loaded or unloaded by longshoremen at the pier, do not constitute
unlawful "work acquisition" under the National Labor Relations Act.
Herbs'
Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414 (1985)
Longshore & Harbor Workers' Act:
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act provides compensation
for the death or disability of any person engaged in "maritime employment"
(status requirement), if the disability or
death results from an injury incurred upon
the navigable waters of the United States or any adjoining pier or other
area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing,
or building a vessel (situs requirement). Respondent
Gray, who was injured while welding a gas
flow line on a fixed offshore oil-drilling platform in Louisiana territorial
waters, does not qualify for benefits under the LHWCA because his employment
was not "maritime."
Jones
& Laughlin Steel Co. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983)
Longshore & Harbor Workers' Act:
a longshoreman may bring a negligence
action under 33 U.S.C. 905(b) against the owner of a vessel who acts as
his own stevedore, even though the longshoreman has received compensation
from the owner-employer under 33 U.S.C. 904. The plain language of 905(a),
which provides that the liability of an employer for compensation prescribed
in 904 "shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such
an employer to the employee," appears to support petitioner's contention
that since, as respondent's employer, it had paid compensation to him under
904, 905(a) absolves it of all other responsibility to respondent for damages.
But such contention is undermined by the plain language of 905(b), which
authorizes a longshoreman whose injury is caused by the negligence of a
vessel to bring a separate action against such a vessel as a third party,
unless the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing
stevedoring services to the vessel.
Pallas
Shipping Shipping Agency, LTD. v. Duris, 461 U.S. 529 (1983)
Longshore & Harbor Workers' Act:
respondent's acceptance of voluntary compensation payments did not constitute
acceptance of compensation "under an award in a compensation order" so
as to give rise to the assignment of his claims against third parties under
33 U.S.C. 933(b).
Florida
Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982)
Maritime Arrest/Procedure (State Sovereign
Immunity)/Salvage: the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the warrant of
arrest issued by the District Court to secure possession of the artifacts
of the Nuestra Senora de Atocha, a 17th-century Spanish galleon, held by
Florida state officials. The relief sought by respondents is not barred
by the Eleventh Amendment but is consistent with the principles of Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 . The warrant of arrest sought possession of
specific property. It did not seek any attachment of state funds and would
impose no burden on the state treasury. And respondents are not asserting
a claim for damages against either the State or its officers.
Griffin
v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982)
Labor Law: district courts have no
discretion to limit the period during which the seaman's wage penalty is
assessed against an owner. Imposition of the penalty is mandatory for each
day that wages are withheld from a seaman in violation of 596.
Foremost
Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982)
Admiralty Jurisdiction: in light of
the need for uniform rules governing navigation, the potential impact on
maritime commerce when two vessels collide on navigable waters, and the
uncertainty and confusion that would necessarily accompany a jurisdictional
test tied to the commercial use of a given boat, a complaint alleging a
collision between two vessels - including pleasure boats - on navigable
waters properly states a claim within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
federal courts.
Rodriguez
v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U.S. 596 (1981)
Longshore & Harbor Workers' Act:
section 33 (b) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
precludes petitioners from pursuing their third-party claims against respondent
shipowners more than six months after having accepted compensation under
an award from their respective stevedore employers. Those rights against
the shipowners had been fully assigned to the stevedore employers after
passage of the six-month period.
Scindia
Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981)
Longshore & Harbor Workers' Act:
a shipowner has a duty to have the ship and its equipment in such condition
that the stevedore may carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety;
and if the shipowner fails at least to warn the stevedore of a hidden danger
which was known to the shipowner, or should have been known to him in the
exercise of reasonable care, he is liable if his negligence causes injury
to a longshoreman.
Sun
Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715 (1980)
Longshore & Harbor Workers' Act:
a State may apply its workers' compensation scheme to landbased injuries
that fall within the coverage of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act.
NLRB
v. International Longshoremen's Assoc., 447 U.S. 490 (1980)
Labor Law: whether the Rules on Containers
(Rules) in a collective-bargaining agreement between the International
Longshoremen's Association (ILA) and employer organizations in the shipping
industry that were adopted in response to the technological innovation
of containerized shipping are a lawful work preservation agreement is to
be decided on remand. Viewing the work allegedly to be preserved by the
Rules from the proper perspective, the Board on remand will be free to
determine whether the Rules represent a lawful attempt to preserve traditional
longshore work, or whether, instead, they are tactically calculated to
satisfy union goals elsewhere.
American
Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274 (1980)
Maritime Torts: general maritime law
authorizes the wife of a harbor worker injured nonfatally aboard a vessel
in state territorial waters to maintain an action for damages for the loss
of her husband's society.
Bloomer
v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 445 U.S. 74 (1980)
Longhsore & Harbor Workers' Act:
a stevedore's lien for the amount of its compensation payment to an injured
longshoreman under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act against the longshoreman's recovery in a negligence action against
the shipowner may not be reduced by an amount representing the stevedore's
proportionate share of the longshoreman's legal expenses in obtaining recovery
from the shipowner.
Seatrain
Shipbuilding Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572 (1980)
Government Regulation: petitioners
received a construction-differential subsidy ("CDS") under Title V of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, to construct a supertanker, and as required
by the Act, agreed to operate it exclusively in foreign trade except as
otherwise authorized. When the vessel was completed, petitioners asked
the Secretary of Commerce to terminate all
restrictions on the vessel's operation in domestic trade in exchange for
their fully secured note repaying in full the vessel's CDS. The Secretary
properly granted their application since the Act empowers the Secretary
to approve full-repayment/permanent-release transactions of the type at
issue here. |
